Beyond Kony 2012

Longtime readers of this blog may note that I have showed uncharacteristic restraint in responding to Kony 2012 by, well, actually not posting on it at all. One reason for this is that the third year of the tenure track oh my word it is hectic and I have several actual scholarly articles coming out to prove it.

Another, better reason though is that thanks to the forward-thinking optimism of Wronging Rights' Amanda Taub, I wrote a chapter for a new ebook. Beyond Kony 2012, edited by Taub, is an attempt to educate journalists, educators, and anyone else wanting to learn more about the LRA crisis and how to effectively respond. There are several contributors from all over the world including many TIA favorites like TMS Ruge, Rebecca Hamilton, Adam Branch, Alanna Shaikh, and Daniel Kalinaki. All the contributors wrote with a critical eye (hint: none of us are big fans of the Invisible Children approach), but also with an eye to responding more effectively and understanding why previous efforts to stop Joseph Kony have failed.

My chapter in the book is entitled, "Avoiding Badvocacy: how to do no harm while doing good." I focus on the importance of listening to local voices, empowering communities to solve their own problem, and avoiding the temptation of making ourselves the saviors of African communities. I'd love to hear your feedbook on the chapter.

The suggested price to download Beyond Kony 2012 is $2.99, but if that's too much for your budget, you can download it for free with absolutely no guilt. It's available formatted as a PDF, MOBI (for Kindle), and as an ePub. I hope you'll take a look.

SWEDOW winner!

Congratulations to this year's winner of our annual bracket challenge, matthiasisyourmom. I have no idea who Matthias is, but you can claim your prizes by emailing me in the next 72 hours. If I don't hear from you by then, the prizes will go to runner-up Seen from Afar, and I'll move down the list from there because I am not kidding when I say that these items are not staying in my house for another year.

Thanks to everyone who played and see you back next year!

2012 APSA Africa Workshop

Are you an African scholar studying politics at an African university? Apply for the 2012 APSA Africa Workshop. Here's the official announcement with application information:

2012 Africa Workshop: Deadline for Applications is March 30 It is with great pleasure that I write to inform you of the 2012 Africa Workshop, jointly convened by the American Political Science Association (APSA) and the University of Botswana. APSA is accepting applications for participation through March 30, 2012 and would appreciate your help in sharing news of this opportunity. Up to 22 Africa-based scholars will be selected, as well as four advanced PhD students from US-based universities. The 2012 Africa Workshop, entitled “Local Communities and the State in Africa” will be led by Professors Parakh Hoon (Virginia Tech), Lauren MacLean (Indiana University), Joseph Mbaiwa (Okavango Research Institute, University of Botswana, Maun Campus), Sethunya Mosime (University of Botswana, Gaborone Campus), and Lungisile Ntsebeza (University of Cape Town). The two-week workshop will be held from July 15 to 27 at the University of Botswana in Gaborone, and will include a special focus on field research methods. This year's workshop is the fifth in APSA’s annual Africa Workshop program; previous workshops have been held in Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, and Tanzania. By bringing together up to 22 Africa-based scholars, as well as four advanced PhD students from US-based universities, the program aims to enhance the capacities of political scientists in Africa and build lasting networks between African scholars and their colleagues in the United States. While the event primarily caters to political scientists, it is also open to scholars from any social science discipline with research relevant to the workshop theme. Since 2008, approximately 100 African and US-based scholars have participated in the workshop series. APSA, with support from the Mellon Foundation, covers all costs associated with participation. Participants at this year’s workshop will explore a series of interrelated theoretical and methodological themes related to the study of African states and sub-national actors. The primary goal of the workshop is to support participants in publishing their research. Program information, eligibility requirements, and a link to the online 2012 Application Form can be found on the APSA Africa Workshop website. The application deadline is March 30, 2012. If you meet the eligibility requirements and are engaged in work related to this workshop’s theme, I welcome you to submit an application. Please also feel free to forward this information and share news of this opportunity as appropriate. APSA is continuously seeking to attract promising scholars to the workshops. We would particularly like to increase the number of applications submitted by women who are based in Africa. If you have any questions or comments, please contact Andrew Stinson, APSA's Africa Workshops Coordinator, at africaworkshops@apsanet.org. To download a PDF version of the call for applications, click here.

In memoriam, Lyn Lusi

Terribly sad news tonight from Goma: HEAL Africa cofounder and program manager Lyn Lusi has died. Everyone who knew Lyn is heartbroken, and our thoughts and prayers go out to Dr. Jo, Nadine, Paluku, and the rest of the family.

To say what one is supposed to say in these circumstances - "She will be missed," "God rest her soul" - seems utterly inadequate to capture Lyn's life. She came to what was then Zaire as a young woman, sent by British Baptists as a missionary teacher. Lyn fell in love with Jo, and after that, she never really left. Yes, they left Congo for a time during the difficult years, as almost everyone did, but their strong sense of responsibility and calling brought them back to Goma to serve, first with Jo working in a local hospital, and eventually by building their own. It was not simply a health care facility, though; the original purpose of what is today HEAL was to train medical professionals to work under some of the most trying conditions on the planet. And that they did. Lyn once jokingly told me that the only reason they opened the hospital was that their students needed patients on which to learn.

And learn they did; as the traumas of war and poverty and the utter incapacity of the Congolese authorities to run a health care system, HEAL became one of the very best providers in the region. It is still the only place offering orthopedic surgery, and is one of about four hospitals in the Kivus that are able to offer high-quality care for fistula and other gynecological traumas. Lyn always viewed HEAL's mission as an holistic one, and insisted that its mission be broader than simply supporting physical health. To that end, she was integral in starting the Nehemiah Committees, which provide an interfaith platform for dispute resolution at the community level throughout the countryside. Under Lyn's management, HEAL also identified and trained a network of women to serve as rape crisis counselors in rural areas, helping victims of violence who might not otherwise have known help was available to access critical medial and psychosocial services.

It is not an exaggeration to say that Lyn's work saved thousands upon thousands of lives.

I first met Lyn and Jo as a young graduate student, desperate for contacts and needing a lot of help to navigate the vagaries of the intersection of state and civil society in Goma. This was just before HEAL Africa - then called DOCS - became a famous place, before the world was talking about the rape crisis and a parade of celebrities, researchers, and do-gooders started traipsing through the hospital on a weekly basis. Lyn handled the transition from small clinic to internationally-known hospital with aplomb. There were frustrations and challenges, to be sure, but Lyn's patience seemed to be infinite. She never rolled her eyes at yet another student coming through the doors to write the definitive master's thesis on "Rape in the Eastern Congo" and she leveraged the attention brought by the rape crisis to garner support for HEAL's many other critical programs.

On a more personal note, Lyn was one of the first people I met in Goma who really believed in the value of my dissertation project. She took my ideas seriously, believed they were worth exploring, and did all she could to help me get through. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that I wouldn't have finished without her; she made introductions and opened doors that made it possible to get the interviews and data I needed. I honestly don't know how I would have done it without her. Lyn believed in community-led and community-centered development. Her wisdom shaped much of my thinking about Congolese agency and the transformative power of community-based development.

It is a sad night in Goma, and it will be sad there for some time to come. I'm trying to think where they will hold the funeral, and how they will accommodate the thousands who will turn up to honor Mama Lyn with songs and dancing and talk of the deep, deep love that motivated her to care for so many. Lyn Lusi is irreplaceable. And, oh, she will be missed.

To make a donation in Lyn's memory, visit the HEAL Africa donation page.

The Heal Africa tribute to Lyn is posted here.

Rift Valley Institute 2012

From friend of the blog Jason Stearns, news about this year's Rift Valley Institute Great Lakes Course. As always, it looks to be fantastic.

We are holding our annual Great Lakes course in Bujumbura from July 7-13. The deadline for applications is April 30.

The course will provide an intensive introduction to the politics and history of Rwanda, Burundi and the DR Congo through a series of presentations and workshops. Around 40 diplomats, aid officials and journalists usually attend, and we feature a dozen lecturers, most of whom stay the whole week. The course this year will inevitably be focusing a lot on the aftermath of elections in the DRC, as well as future challenges in Rwanda, and the risk of an escalation of violence in Burundi. As always, we will also spend several days exploring the deep history of the region and the roots of the conflict.

This year, our instructors include:

• Filip Reyntjens (University of Antwerp)
• Jean Omasombo (University of Kinshasa and Royal Africa Museum)
• Koen Vlassenroot (University of Ghent)
• Anneke van Woudenberg (Human Rights Watch)
• Jean-Paul Kimonyo (Office of the President, Rwanda)
• Séverin Mugangu (Official University of Bukavu)
• Arsène Kirhero (OCHA)
• Steve Hege (UN Group of Experts on Congo)
• Greg Salter (Economist Intelligence Unit)
• Willy Nindorera (International Crisis Group, Burundi)
• Mvemba Dizolele (Johns Hopkins University)
  

The course directors are Jason Stearns (former coordinator, UN Group of Experts), Emily Paddon (Oxford University), and Philip Winter (former chief of staff, Inter-Congolese Dialogue)

I have attached a brochure, and more information can be found at www.riftvalley.net.

it's that time...

It's one of the best times of the year - the NCAA Men's Basketball Tournament! Join the SWEDOW2012 group at ESPN.com to participate in the aid/development/foreign policy blogosphere's best bracket competition.

As usual, I have a host of fabulous SWEDOW* prizes for whoever wins the group, courtesy of fabulous aid, development, and security people sending me their junk all year long. Last year's winner somehow "forgot" to claim his prize, so that means you get twice the stuff this year. As you can see in the pic above, this year's prize pack includes a stuffed Ebola virus toy, dented ping-pong balls, and a super-classy "I (hammer/sickle) the 80's" t-shirt. Join today - brackets lock just before the tournament starts on Thursday.

*SWEDOW = Stuff WE DOn't Want = "Unnecessary or inappropriate items donated to a charity organization or relief effort."

kristof in sudan

Where in the world is Nick Kristof? Late last week, he posted a series of secretive tweets alluding to his trip to an unsafe destination:


On Saturday, Kristof revealed that he's been reporting from Sudan's Nuba Mountains, a point confirmed by his Sunday, February 19 column:

"The Sudanese armed forces try to keep aid workers and journalists out, so the story of suffering has not received much international attention. I’m going to try to slip into the Nuba Mountains and report back. Stay tuned. "

According to a tweet from earlier today (Monday, February 20), Kristof made it to the Nuba Mountains, where he interviewed SPLM soldiers.

Setting aside the fact that the Nuba Mountains story has actually gotten quite a bit of attention over the past six months or so, it's obviously a tragic situation that needs to be reported. However, there are a few problems with Kristof's approach here:

1. There's an obvious bias in the story. While I'm not one to defend the murderous Bashir regime, the Sudanese government does have a legitimate concern that aid coming into the region along that route will fall into the hands of the rebels rather than the people it is meant to help. Kristof needs to be more clearly focused on the fact that just because Khartoum is bad does not mean that everything that the rebels and their South Sudanese compatriots do is perfect. (As Louisa Lombard aptly notes, South Sudan is guilty of discrimination against minority ethnic groups as well). The point here is not that humanitarian aid is not urgently needed to help the Nuba; it obviously is. Rather, the point is that the kind of journalism that takes sides does not help in the goal of getting Khartoum to allow aid through or to give them assurances that the rebels won't take control of that aid for their own purposes. Biased reporting reinforces Khartoum's belief that agencies like Samaritan's Purse (which Kristof names in his story) are politicized, biased, and out to destroy their rule, which makes it harder for all aid agencies and the UN to help.
2. Other reporters now can't get access. Kristof is on a short reporting trip to the region, but there is a strong cadre of experienced reporters in Sudan who have covered the region for a long time and will be there for years after Kristof is gone. Because Kristof has announced to the world that he's sneaking around in the Nuba Mountains, their jobs are now more difficult. Already, several journalists have had to cancel planned trips to South Kordofan due to concerns about the safety of Westerners. Many journalists working in the region are under the impression that a manhunt for Kristof is happening, a perception reinforced by an apparent uptick in bombings along the road from the Nuba Mountains to the nearest refugee camp in South Sudan over the last couple of days. There's no way to prove that this rise in violence is linked to Kristof's announcement, of course, and I don't think there's solid evidence to support that claim, although we do know that there have been a lot more ambushes of buses along the route and rocket attacks by the SAF over the weekend. More importantly, though, is that people are behaving as though it were true. Why does this matter? Because if reporters who are in this for the long haul can't get in, the story won't be told as it unfolds. There is no question that the attention brought by Kristof will make it more difficult for reporters to get legitimate access to the area. If the famine many are predicting does break out in South Kordofan in the months to come, those same reporters won't be able to tell the story without risking their lives to do so. That will be tragic for those who will need that reporting to draw attention to their plight.
3. NGO's are on edge. Most of Kristof's trips to places like the Nuba Mountains are done in conjunction with an international NGO that wants to get publicity for its efforts. The NGO provides logistical assistance and, in return, the reporter mentions the NGO's good work in his or her column. The NGO gets good press, the reporter gets the story, and everyone is generally happy. The problem now is that because of Kristof's shenanigans, NGO's in the region are very reluctant to help reporters get the story. Moreover, as it's pretty clear from Kristof's column that Samaritan's Purse is likely helping him, that puts aid workers - especially those working for SP - on the ground in danger, especially if the SAF really is out trying to find Kristof. Rather than being perceived by those on the ground as a neutral humanitarian agency, Samaritan's Purse is now seen as an ally of South Sudan. That's an incredibly dangerous situation for those who are trying to carry out neutral humanitarian work.
4. There's no Sudanese agency. As is his modus operandi, all the Sudanese quoted by Kristof in the story are victims: a rape survivor, people who've been shot at, refugees. This reinforces stereotypes of Sudanese passivity and a lack of agency. It's not surprising; Africans are almost always victims in Kristof's reporting, but it's an utterly incomplete picture of what's actually going on.

It's easy to criticize Nick Kristof for his longstanding pattern of irresponsible and thoughtless reporting from dangerous locations, but I do think there are some challenging questions for journalists and academics here. How do you balance getting the story with not putting others in danger? Should you announce to the world that you're in a dangerous place in the name of awareness? How do you protect those who help you get the story, as well as the people they're trying to serve?

In my view, Kristof could have told this very important story after his return from the region, thus avoiding creating some of the dangers into which he has now inadvertently placed others. He also could have discussed in more detail why Khartoum is afraid to allow aid in, and what could be done to convince the Sudanese government to take another approach.

What do you think?

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Correction: The worst-case scenarios for South Kordofan are not a famine, they are for a Level 4 (Emergency) Food Insecurity Situation. My apologies for the error.

what's happening in ituri? part ii

Today I'm pleased to present a guest post from Dan Fahey. Dan is an ACM Mellon Post-Doc Fellow in the Political Science Department at Colorado College (USA). What follows are the second of two posts on his observations from a recent field research trip to Ituri, a district in northeastern DRC bordering Uganda to the east and North Kivu to the south. Part I is available here.

LAND DISPUTES

In post-conflict Ituri, land disputes over boundaries or rights of occupation and use are pervasive. Since May 2009, UN Habitat (which has an office in Bunia) has identified more than 1,000 land disputes in Ituri’s Djugu and Mahagi territories alone. Some conflicts began decades ago during the colonial era, while others are rooted in annexations, displacements and occupations during the late Mobutu-era and the wars in Ituri (1996-2007). While local efforts and the work of UN Habitat have succeeded in resolving some disputes, hundreds of conflicts remain unresolved, in large part due to the negligence of the State apparatus at the district, provincial, and national levels.

In Ituri, land disputes generally take place between individuals, between a community and an individual (e.g. between a local community and a concession owner), and between communities. According to mediators, the latter two categories are the most difficult to resolve, in part because land disputes are often incorporated into larger struggles for political and economic power. For example, in Djugu territory’s Walendu Pitsi collectivity (where the Ituri war started in 1999), local authorities have explicitly expressed their desire to keep Hema concession owners (whom they blame for starting the war) and Hema villagers from returning to work or live in the collectivity. In Irumu territory, a long-running dispute over the boundary between Walendu Bindi and Bahema Sud collectivities has intensified in the last decade. In this case, Lendu (Ngiti) desires to re-write the boundary (giving them control over large swaths of land currently in Bahema Sud) invoke customary rights but are also tied to economic issues, including collection of taxes, fishing rights, and control of land along Lake Albert, where oil exploration may begin in the next few years.

Local efforts to mediate land conflicts (notably by Bunia-based Reseau Haki na Amani) had some success, but were limited in their ability to address hundreds of entrenched disputes. In 2011, UN Habitat established a Land Commission that has five field offices in Djugu and Mahagi territories (these offices have resolved more than 200 disputes since May 2011) and a head office in Bunia. The Land Commission is doing very important work with little means (each office has only one motorcycle and a very limited budget), but is not without shortcomings. Of the four offices I visited, two (Fataki and Largu/Drodro) were well organized, but two (Bunia and Kpandroma) had serious problems. The Bunia office is almost never open, while Kpandroma office staff articulated their belief that Walendu Pitsi is for Lendu, and that those who left during the war (i.e. Hema) are not welcome to return. UN Habitat is aware of these shortcomings, but constrained by local political dynamics and budget issues. One solution would be to work more closely with local organizations in Ituri, while another would be to get the District government to financially support the Land Commission, which it has so far refused to do.

The silence of the State on land disputes in Ituri is deafening. MONUC succeeded in bringing peace to most of Ituri in 2007, but since that time the government has failed to address widespread land problems that have the potential to reignite war. One point that virtually everyone (villagers, local authorities, UN staff) agrees upon is that the government needs to clearly define boundaries and to establish who has legal rights to land in disputed areas.

Why has the State neglected its responsibilities? While limited State capacity may be one factor, the larger problem seems to be a lack of will. The government (i.e. PPRD loyalists at all levels from Bunia to Kisangani to Kinshasa) seems unwilling to take on this difficult political issue, particularly because during the war the Kabila regime supported some of the same Lendu authorities that are now justifying land occupations and boundary shifts. Some believe the State is too busy extracting wealth from the people of Ituri to address problems that threaten the long-term peace and stability of the district. State action is clearly needed, but there is no indication it is forthcoming.

ELECTIONS

According to a paper by Francois Bura Dhengo (professor at ISP in Bunia), there were 536 candidates for National Deputy in Ituri, representing several dozen political parties. With the assistance of the Carter Center, the Bunia Diocese’s Peace and Justice Commission (CDJP) worked with its Episcopal equivalent (CEJP) to deploy 318 election observers in Ituri for election day. A report by CDJP (7 Jan. 2012) stated there were numerous election-day problems in Ituri, including polling stations not having enough ballots, stations opening late or not at all, electoral agents illegally providing “assistance” to voters, and the presence of campaign materials (especially for presidential candidate No. 3) in polling places. In Ituri, MONUSCO played a key role in transporting election materials to polling places, further exposing the weakness of the Congolese state.

According to Congo’s National Independent Election Commission (CENI report, 1 Feb. 2012), Ituri voters elected 26 National Deputies from 15 different political parties. The parties garnering the most seats were PPRD (4), MIP (3), MSR (3), and RRC (3). Former rebel groups fared poorly in Ituri, with UPC gaining the most seats (2), followed by FNI (1) and RCD/K-ML (1). Notably, CNDP opened an office in August 2011 in Bunia and nominated candidates, but did not win any seats. CNDP’s arrival was interpreted locally as being a strategic move to establish a presence in Ituri that would enable CNDP to execute post-election actions, if President Kabila had lost.

Among the election winners were current Orientale governor and PPRD loyalist Autsai Asenga Medard, who was elected in Aru territory. As Governor of Orientale province, Autsai Asenga has managed a patronage network that has siphoned untold millions of dollars out of Ituri, while providing virtually nothing in return. Also of note, Bunia native John Tibasima won a seat in Irumu territory for the RDPR party. This former RCD/K-ML official during the war years had lost in the 2006 elections, but had “acquired” a Senate seat. Consistent with provincial and national results, only 2 of the 26 Deputies elected in Ituri are women.

this & that

• "For next steps in Congo, listen to the Congolese."
• The auditors at Elm Consulting have put together a critical evaluation of Enough's ranking system of electronics companies' behavior on the conflict minerals question. Money quote: "Our review found that the rankings: Reflect outdated and incomplete information, Appear to contain bias, and Are inconsistent in applying their scoring system." Read my previous criticism of the rankings system here.
• Jason Stearns two-part interview with the UN Group of Experts on DRC is well worth your time. Part one here and part two here.
• If I had a dollar for every time a student wrote "economical" when he meant "economic," I would have several more dollars than I do today.
• Duncan Green on the moral imperative to end hunger.

what's happening in ituri? a report from the field, part 1

Today I'm pleased to present a guest post from Dan Fahey. Dan is an ACM Mellon Post-Doc Fellow in the Political Science Department at Colorado College (USA). What follows are his observations from a recent field research trip to Ituri, a district in northeastern DRC bordering Uganda to the east and North Kivu to the south.

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This update is based largely on fieldwork conducted during Jan-Feb 2012 in Ituri. Part 2 will include discussions on land conflicts and election results.

BOOMING BUNIA

Since November 2007, when MONUC succeeded in pacifying Ituri (with the exception of southern Irumu – see below), Ituri’s capital of Bunia has been slowly but surely growing and transforming. Security in Bunia has vastly improved, although off-duty police and soldiers continue nighttime criminal activity in some parts of town. In a scene unthinkable four years ago, people walk the streets at night, frequenting numerous bars and clubs that have sprung up. Bunia is in the midst of a construction and rehabilitation boom, with new hotels, fourteen petrol stations (and counting), the return of banks, and new universities. AngloGold Ashanti Kilo (AGK) – the company poised to start industrial gold mining in Mongbwalu – has contracted Kisangani-based Bego Congo to construct several kilometers of drainage along the main road in town. Despite the vast sums of money extracted from Ituri by the PPRD apparatus, there is still no paved road in Bunia (and the dust – le sixième chantier! – is severe at this time of year). But there is talk the main road will be paved, next year…

Private businessmen drive most of the growth in Bunia. Much of the investment comes from gold traders and cattle ranchers who have diversified their business interests. Some of these same businessmen were involved in supporting armed groups during the war in Ituri, so some people view their investment in Bunia as a sign that they will not support a return to war. There are still many problems in Bunia, such as a lack of potable water and a heavy dependence on MONUSCO for the local economy, but there is a sense that the balance of political and economic power in Orientale province is shifting from Kisangani to Bunia. The significance of this shift remains unclear, particularly since PPRD holds the political power in Ituri, but change is in the air.

INSECURITY IN IRUMU

With the international focus in northeast Congo on Dungu, the ongoing conflict in southern Irumu territory has been obscured. In November 2007, Cobra Matata – then leader of the FRPI group in this area – entered FARDC after having had his troops enter the DDR process. A few renegade FRPI officers who did not get the posts (or money) they wanted refused to cooperate, and remained in the bush waging a low-intensity campaign in southern Irumu. In May 2010, Cobra left his post in Kinshasa and returned to the bush; suspected reasons include a falling out with superiors and fear of arrest. Since then, FRPI has grown stronger, with an estimated 200 combatants; it also collaborates with the smaller FPJC group. On 22 Jan. 2012, news that two former FRPI commanders (Lt. Col. Dark and Major Baby) had deserted their FARDC posts in Lubumbashi and rejoined Cobra raised concerns about an escalation of conflict. MONUSCO is currently supporting FARDC operations against FRPI, which have increased in intensity since late January.

There are several aspects of the FRPI situation worthy of note. Although FRPI survives in part by stealing from the local population, it also has local support. Many people distrust FARDC, which engages in theft, extortion, and violence against local populations. A letter from the Chief of Walendu Bindi (20 Jan. 2012) to President Kabila restates Cobra’s demands made in Oct. 2011 on Radio Okapi; several observers point to this letter and other information as evidence that some local authorities support Cobra. Among Cobra’s demands are: amnesty like that enjoyed by Bosco Ntaganda and Laurent Nkunda; release of prisoners; and a DDR process. The national government does not acknowledge FRPI as a rebel group, referring to them as “bandits,” and refusing to allow a DDR process to begin (UNDP is ready to do this if the government consents).

There are reasons to doubt the sincerity of both Cobra and the government in ending conflict in southern Irumu. Cobra and some of his men have already deserted from the national army, and their actions appear more criminal than political. Since Cobra does not enjoy strong support from donor-darling Rwanda, he is unlikely to get amnesty and achieve a high position in FARDC, like indicted war criminal Bosco Ntaganda; therefore he may not be satisfied with government concessions (which, in any event, do not appear to be forthcoming). On the other hand, numerous sources doubt the sincerity of FARDC in addressing the problem of FRPI. FARDC officers are profiting from the conflict through the theft and extortion perpetrated by their soldiers. As an example, soldiers openly take 200 Congolese francs (about $0.22) from each passerby on checkpoints along roads (I observed at least a dozen such checkpoints between Bogoro and Geti), which is hard on the impoverished local population. MONUSCO is placed in a difficult position by having to support FARDC, and some observers have questioned why MONUSCO does not take the lead in the fight and relegate FARDC to a supporting role, as MONUC did during the key period of 2005-07 in Ituri. This conflict is likely to grind on during 2012, with the local population suffering at the hands of both FRPI and FARDC.

CHOLERA OUTBREAK

In early December 2011, an outbreak of cholera occurred in the Geti health zone. The outbreak spread to the northeast, into the Tchomia health zone, then west to Bunia and then north as far as the Jiba health zone. Overall, six affected health zones in Irumu and Djugu territories have had 1,024 cholera cases and 30 deceased persons as of 5 Feb. 2012. The Tchomia health zone has been the hardest hit, and approximately 78% of all cases are in this health zone. According to an OCHA bulletin (10 Feb. 2012): “An assessment into the water and sanitation conditions revealed that the population in Tchomia is obliged to drink unsafe water from Lake Albert as the drinking water infrastructure in Tchomia is defective. This situation is aggravated by the town’s lack of sanitary installations, as 60% of its households have no latrines.”